Law and Society

CLAT v/s NLAT : The Untold Perspetives

The legal battle between the Consortium of National Law Universities (“NLU”) and National Law University of India University, Bangalore (“NLSIU”) is a matter of interest to both lawyers and the aspiring lawyers. A lot of deliberations have been made on the competency of NLSIU to conduct separate entrance exam (“NLAT”) and now it is left to the Supreme Court to decide the matter on 21st September, 2020. Instead of going into those arguments, the present article discusses certain perspectives, which were not put forth before the Court.

Legitimate expectation of students not considered

When the students applied for CLAT in the month of March, 2020, they understood that they had a chance to get into NLSIU, the top most ranked Law university of the country along with other NLUs provided they cleared the entrance examination with appropriate merit. In fact, when the students paid the entrance fee of Rs 4000 (Rs 3500 for reserve category) for CLAT examination, they had the expectation to enter into any of the twenty-two NLUs of the country. When NLSIU backed out at the last moment and went on with its own entrance examination NLAT, the legitimate expectation of the students who had enrolled for CLAT was dashed on two fronts; first, they could not compete for NLSIU, and second, they could compete for only twenty-one NLUs though they had paid to compete for all twenty-two. True, the Counsellor for VC of NLSIU claimed that they had taken enough step to publicize the new development and also kept the examination fee a bare minimum. But this argument does not resolve the unanswered issue: when the students were required pay Rs 4000/- to appear the entrance test for admission to any of the twenty-two NLUs, they had to actually pay an additional Rs 150/-. The authorities cannot wish away saying Rs 150/- is a meagre amount. Taking a cue from Sr. Adv. Mr. Sankarnarayan’s analogy of changing the rule of game (cricket-football analogy) and Sr. Adv. Mr. Datar’s counter argument to it, the author would like to say that (if at all any analogy could be made), one bought a ticket of cricket match for 28th September, only to know that he would be allowed to watch a football match on 12th September with additional expense. Continue reading

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Law and Society

Police vs Police: What says the Supreme Court?

A vitriolic debate between members of Central Armed Police Force [ hereinafter “CAPF”] and the members of Indian Police Service [ hereinafter “IPS”] has generated a lot of steam in the blog world for last one year. Though amusing, at the same time unfortunate, to see two bulwarks of the internal security infrastructure of the Nation fighting out in a dirty manner, the core issue has great legal implications on service matter laws which needs to be understood very minutely. There is an inherent difficulty in understanding as well as interpreting matters concerning service laws, because the service associations tend to act like a trade union in guarding their service interests and rightly so. Hence, without trying to court any further controversy, this blog tries to understand the view of the Honorable Supreme Court in this matter. Continue reading

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Law and Society, Uncategorized

PASSIVE EUTHANASIA: AN ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT JUDGMENTS

“No life that breathes with human breath has ever truly longed for death”

— Alfred Tennyson

The humanist undercurrent of Indian Constitution is best realized in its supreme emphasis on the fundamental right to life and liberty. The Constituent assembly sub-committee on fundamental rights had spent hours on preparing the framework on safeguarding life and liberty of people. The idea of inviolability of right to life was so sanctimonious that most of the debate was aimed at developing a modality on how not to infringe upon individual’s life and liberty. The committee had not ventured to define the term “life” as perhaps it started with the basic premise that “life” is so fundamental a concept that a definition of life and its constituents was not required. Such a theoretical understanding is subtly put forth by H.M. Seervai as “Neither the constitution nor any law confers the right to life. The right arises from the existence of a living human body.”[1] However, a lack of definition of life and its constituents has compelled the Courts, in subsequent discourses on the question of right to life, to fall back upon a grossly inadequate premise given by Munn[2] that defined “life as something more than animal existence.” Such a simplistic definition that keeps the interpretation of the term “life” open ended, has resulted in a plethora of legal literature over a period of time. Continue reading

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